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Civil Society or Democracy? 
A Dutch Paradox
  
	 remieg aerts | radboud university nijmegen
Since the 1990s, research has been carried out worldwide into the relationship 
between ‘civil society’ (an organised, self-aware society) and the formation 
of democracy. Dutch historians have to date shown little interest in this field 
of research, although the case of the Netherlands is an interesting one, both 
historically and in terms of current affairs. This article makes a case for the 
relevance of Dutch history to the debate on civil society in relation to three 
points. Firstly, where civil society is a phenomenon of the eighteenth and 
above all the nineteenth centuries, the society of the Republic demonstrates 
that a corporatist order can show characteristics of a civil society. Secondly, 
the factor of religion can be an important element in the promotion of social 
commitment. Thirdly, Dutch history flags up a paradox: it seems that a highly 
developed, civil society can rather limit than promote the need for political 
democracy and the recognition of an independent political sphere.
Civil society as a research theme
‘Civil	society’	has	proven	one	of	the	most	successful	concepts,	both	in	the	
social	sciences	and	in	public	debate,	as	is	evident	from	the	profusion	of	
publications	on	the	subject	that	have	appeared	in	the	past	two	decades.	
Although	it	harks	back	to	republican	discourse	and	political	philosophy	of	
the	early	modern	age,	the	concept	made	a	comeback	in	the	1980s	in	circles	
of	East	European	dissident	intellectuals.	Faced	with	an	overwhelming	and	
repressive	state,	they	entertained	the	ideal	of	a	distinct	social	realm	leaving	
space	for	free	social	organization	and	development.1	The	notion	of	‘civil	
society’	has	referred	to	the	recognition	and	the	quality	of	society,	and	to	the	
spread	of	civic	attitudes.	The	concept	has	posited,	firstly,	a	social	and	public	
sphere	distinct	from	the	market,	the	state	and	the	private	domain	of	family	
and	clan	relations.	Secondly,	it	has	referred	to	the	degree	of	self-organization,	
civic	commitment	and	voluntary	association	a	society	demonstrates.	Thirdly,	
and	more	normatively,	it	has	assumed	that	citizens	can	cope	with	plurality	
and	differences,	and	have	a	sense	of	common	interest.	
	
t
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	 Having	initially	been	an	issue	mainly	within	the	social	and	political	
sciences,	during	the	past	decade,	civil	society	has	become	an	object	of	study	
among	historians	too.	They	have	begun	to	explore	civil	society	as	a	research	
subject:	in	a	national	context,	as	a	transnational	phenomenon	and	within	a	
comparative	perspective.2	Indeed,	it	is	‘a	deeply	historical	concept’.3	Historians	
arrived	at	the	subject	by	a	roundabout	route.	About	1980,	social	and	cultural	
history	had	taken	an	interest	in	the	study	of	Enlightenment	‘sociability’.	At	
the	same	time,	in	the	1980s	and	1990s,	an	impressive	research	programme	ran	
in	Germany	on	Bürgertum (citizenship	and	the	middle	class)	and	Bürgerlichkeit	
(middle-class	culture).4	Apart	from	these	issues,	yet	relevant	to	the	study	of	
civil	society,	is	the	extensive	field	of	urban	history,	dealing	with	aspects	of	the	
city	as	a	system,	the	urban	community	and	the	urban	way	of	life.5	Although	
urban	history	research	isn’t	concerned	with	civil	society	as	such,	in	recent	
Studien zum 19. und 20. Jahrhundert (Wiesbaden 
2004); Graeme Morton, Boudien de Vries and R.J. 
Morris (eds.), Civil Society, Associations and Urban 
Places: Class, Nation and Culture in Nineteenth-
Century Europe (Aldershot etc. 2006); Stefan-
Ludwig Hoffmann, Geselligkeit und Demokratie. 
Vereine und Zivile Gesellschaft im transnationalen 
Vergleich 1750-1914 (Göttingen 2003); the same 
work in English: Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, Civil 
Society 1750-1914 (Basingstoke, New York 2006). 
3 Keane, Civil Society, vii.
4 A concise interim analysis of the research 
results in: Jonathan Sperber, ‘Bürger, Bürgertum, 
Bürgerlichkeit, Bürgerliche Gesellschaft. Studies 
on the German (Upper) Middle Class and Its 
Sociocultural World’, Journal of Modern History 
69 (1997) 271-297; Jürgen Kocka (ed.), Bürgertum 
im 19. Jahrhundert. Deutschland im europäischen 
Vergleich (3 volumes, Munich 1988); Jürgen 
Kocka and Allan Mitchell (eds.), Bourgeois Society 
in Nineteenth-Century Europe (Oxford 1993). 
Alongside Jürgen Kocka, Lothar Gall, Dieter 
Langewiesche, Ute Frevert, Gunilla-Friederike 
Budde, Hartmut Kaelble, Hans-Joachim Puhle and 
Manfred Hettling were the principal contributors 
to this research theme in the 1980s and 1990s.
5 In the United States and Europe, there are several 
sizeable associations, centres, networks and 
groups devoted to the study of urban history.
 I would like to thank Prof. José Harris (Oxford) 
and Dr. Boudien de Vries (Amsterdam) for their 
valuable comments on an earlier draft of this 
article.
1 Jürgen Kocka, ‘Civil Society in Historical 
Perspective’, in: John Keane (ed.), Civil Society: 
Berlin Perspectives (New York, Oxford 2006) 37-51; 
Jan Kubik, ‘Between the State and Networks of 
“Cousins”: The Role of Civil Society and Noncivil 
Associations in the Democratization of Poland’, 
in: Nancy Bermeo and Philip Nord (eds.), Civil 
Society before Democracy: Lessons from Nineteenth-
Century Europe (Lanham, Maryland etc. 2000) 181-
207; Klaus von Beyme, ‘Zivilgesellschaft – Karriere 
und Leistung eines Modebegriffs’, in: Manfred 
Hildermeier, Jürgen Kocka and Christoph Conrad 
(eds.), Europäische Zivilgesellschaft in Ost und 
West. Begriff, Geschichte, Chancen (Frankfurt am 
Main, New York 2000). 
2 Bermeo and Nord, Civil Society before Democracy; 
Hildermeier, Kocka and Conrad, Europäische 
Zivilgesellschaft; Keane, Civil Society; José Harris 
(ed.), Civil Society in British History: Ideas, Identities, 
Institutions (Oxford 2003); Frank Trentmann (ed.), 
Paradoxes of Civil Society: New Perspectives on 
Modern German and British History (New York, 
Oxford 2003); Ralph Jessen, Sven Reichardt and 
Ansgar Klein (eds.), Zivilgesellschaft als Geschichte. 
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years	the	subject	has	indeed	become	a	research	topic	among	students	of	urban	
history.6	Despite	growing	international	interest,	Dutch	historians	have	shown	
little	interest	in	addressing	such	questions,	however.	Contributions	by	Dutch	
historians	to	international	projects	and	volumes	on	civil	society	are	rare.7	In	
some	cases,	foreign	historians	have	dealt	with	aspects	of	civil	society	in	Dutch	
history.8	Several	explanations	can	be	put	forward	for	this	reluctance.	Dutch	
historiography	of	the	modern	period	has	developed	without	much	attention	
from	historians	outside	of	the	Netherlands	for	what	had	become	of	a	country	
of	little	consequence;	in	marked	contrast	to	the	lively	interest	shown	in	the	
age	of	the	Dutch	Republic	and	in	colonial	history,	when	the	Netherlands	was	
a	true	international	power.	Moreover,	since	the	nineteenth	century,	Dutch	
culture	has	been	mainly	receptive	and	has	made	a	prudently	pragmatic	use	of	
models,	ideas	and	movements	developed	abroad.	As	a	result,	modern	Dutch	
history	may	well	be	‘interesting	and	unique	in	certain	ways’,	but	it	is	still	‘very	
much	part	of	the	North-West	European	mainstream’,	as	an	English	textbook	
puts	it.9	
	 Over	the	past	twenty-odd	years,	Dutch	historians	have	conducted	
a	good	deal	of	research	on	the	culture	of	sociability	or	associational	life	in	
the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries,	and	on	subjects	such	as	middle-
class	culture,	urban	history,	liberalism,	political	culture	and	the	formation	
of	modern	democracy	in	the	nineteenth	and	the	twentieth	centuries.	There	
has	been	no	focus	on	civil	society,	however.	A	discussion	on	the	merits	of	the	
concept	has	recently	started,	but	historians	have	been	reluctant	to	adopt	the	
concept	as	a	particularly	workable	tool	with	which	to	interpret	and	structure	
8 Thomas Ertman, ‘Liberalization, Democratization, 
and the Origins of “Pillarized” Civil Society 
in Nineteenth-Century Belgium and the 
Netherlands’, in: Bermeo and Nord, Civil Society; 
Jürgen Nautz, ‘Sociopolitische Fragmentierung 
und Kompromissbereitschaft in der ersten 
Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts. Österreich und die 
Niederlande im Vergleich’, in: Jessen, Reichardt 
and Klein, Zivilgesellschaft, 262-282.
9 Michael Wintle, An Economic and Social History of 
the Netherlands 1800-1920: Demographic, Economic 
and Social Transition (Cambridge 2000) 345-
347; a similar assessment in Horst Lademacher, 
Geschichte der Niederlande. Politik, Verfassung, 
Wirtschaft (Darmstadt 1983) 222.
6 Morton, De Vries and Morris, Civil Society. A 
concise dissertation on the issue in: John Keane, 
‘Cities and Civil Society’, in: Keane, Civil Society, 
1-36.
7 Ton Nijhuis, ‘So nah – so fern. Das Verhältnis von 
Staat und Zivilgesellschaft in den Niederlanden 
im Vergleich zu Deutschland’, in: Hildermeier, 
Kocka and Conrad, Europäische Zivilgesellschaft, 
219-244; Boudien de Vries, ‘Voluntary 
Associations in the Netherlands, 1750-1900’, in: 
Morton, De Vries and Morris, Civil Society, 103-
116; Jan Hein Furnée, ‘In Good Company: Class, 
Gender and Politics in The Hague’s Gentlemen’s 
Clubs, 1750-1900’, ibidem, 117-138. In 2008, the 
Dutch interdisciplinary quarterly De Negentiende 
Eeuw [dne] 32:2 (2008) devoted a special, English-
language issue to civil society as a research 
theme.
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the	past,	due	to	its	ambiguity	and	its	normative,	political	overtones.	Besides,	
the	praise	of	civil	society	smacks	too	much	of	a	fundamental	dislike	of	state	
power,	which	may	be	a	distinctive	feature	of	American	and	British	history,	but	
which	does	not	resonate	in	the	Dutch	situation.10
	 Yet	the	Dutch	absence	in	the	international	civil	society	discussion	
may	well	strike	historians	as	odd.	Since	the	days	of	the	Dutch	Republic,	
the	Netherlands	has	had	a	reputation	for	being	an	outstandingly	civic	and	
bourgeois,	egalitarian,	liberal	and	tolerant	society.	The	Dutch	language	
developed	a	rich	vocabulary	to	denote	a	variety	of	voluntary	civic	associations	
at	an	early	stage.	Whereas	the	English	vocabulary	heaps	together	most	
varieties	under	‘societies’	and	‘associations’,	the	Dutch	language	distinguishes	
a	dozen	words,	taken	from	old	communal	arrangements,	business	
relationships	and	guild	culture.11	And	today,	the	Netherlands	is	generally	
regarded	as	one	of	the	world’s	most	successful	democracies.	The	poldermodel,	or	
collective	bargaining	economy,	in	which	the	state,	employers’	organizations,	
trade	unions	and	other	interest	groups	seek	to	harmonize	their	interests,	
received	wide	international	acclaim	in	the	1990s.12	This	form	of	consultation	
is	part	of	what,	in	theories	of	democracy,	goes	by	the	name	of	‘consociational	
democracy’	or	‘consensus	democracy’.	It	was	mainly	through	the	work	carried	
out	by	Dutch-American	political	scientist	Arend	Lijphart	since	the	1960s	that	
the	Dutch	political	system	has	become	the	model	of	this	type	of	democracy.	
Applied	in	a	normative	sense,	consociational	or	consensus	democracy	is	
thought	to	be	a	preferable	solution	for	countries	covering	deep	ethnic,	
linguistic,	religious	or	ideological	rifts.13	Besides,	the	Dutch	are	–	at	least	as	
much	as	Americans	–	a	nation	of	associators,	showing	the	highest	average	
number	of	memberships	of	voluntary	associations	in	the	world	in	the	1990s.14	
Today,	together	with	Sweden	and	Denmark,	the	Netherlands	still	has	the	
Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands 
(Berkeley, Cal. 1968); Arend Lijphart, Democracy 
in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration 
(New Haven, CT 1977); Arend Lijphart, Patterns of 
Democracy: Government Forms and Performance in 
Thirty-Six Countries (New Haven, CT. 1999); K.R. 
Luther and K. Deschouwer (eds.), Party Elites in 
Divided Societies: Political Parties in Consociational 
Democracy (London 1999). 
14 J.E. Curtis, D.E. Baer and E.G. Grabb, ‘Nations 
of Joiners: Explaining Voluntary Association 
Membership in Democratic Societies’, American 
Sociological Review 66 (2001) 783-805.
10 Maartje Janse, ‘Towards a History of Civil 
Society’, dne 32:2 (2008) 104-121; Henk te Velde, 
‘Civil Society and Dutch History’, ibidem, 122-125; 
James Kennedy, ‘A Response to Hoffmann on 
Civil Society’, ibidem, 126-131.
11 M. de Vries et al., Woordenboek der Nederlandsche 
Taal (29 volumes, The Hague 1882-1998); www.
gtb.inl.nl.
12 Jaap Woldendorp, The Polder Model: From 
Disease to Miracle?. Dutch Neo-Corporatism 1965-
2000 (Amsterdam 2005); Henk te Velde, Van 
regentenmentaliteit tot populisme. Politieke tradities 
in Nederland (Amsterdam 2010) 205-226.
13 Arend Lijphart, The Politics of Accommodation: 
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highest	average	rate	of	membership,	at	least	within	Europe.15	Dutch	society	is	
also	listed	among	the	‘high-trust	countries’	at	the	top	of	a	global	civil	society	
index.16
	 Thus	Dutch	history	may	well	be	expected	to	be	relevant	to	the	
understanding	of	civil	society;	particularly,	perhaps,	in	relation	to	the	
development	of	democracy.	I	will	address	three	salient	issues	in	relation	
to	this.	The	first	concerns	the	customary	limitation	of	the	period	under	
investigation.	Most	studies	on	civil	society	focus	on	the	later	eighteenth	and	
the	nineteenth	centuries:	the	heyday	of	the	voluntary	association.	The	earlier	
period	tends	to	be	written	off	by	historians	of	civil	society	as	a	society	checked	
by	the	constraints	of	corporative	bonds,	tradition,	and	oppression	by	state	and	
church.	The	twentieth	century	is	out	of	the	picture	too,	since	the	function	of	
voluntary	associations	had	then	been	taken	over	by	formal	and	professional	
institutions	such	as	political	parties,	trade	unions	and	media	responsive	to	
public	opinion.	Dutch	history	suggests	a	different	focus	for	our	attention	
than	on	the	nineteenth	century	alone.	It	calls	for	a	new	understanding	of	early	
modern	corporatism	and	for	a	closer	look	at	the	(sometimes	odd)	entanglement	
of	civil	society	and	the	constitution	of	democracy	in	the	twentieth	century.
	 Next,	there	is	the	issue	of	religion,	often	treated	as	a	difficult	element	
in	theories	of	civil	society.	Many	countries	used	to	have,	or	still	have,	a	
situation	of	a	single	church	holding	a	dominant	position.	Religion	under	
these	circumstances	is	not	a	matter	of	free	choice,	but	a	condition	into	which	
a	person	is	born	and	raised.	As	civil	society	is	often	regarded	as	a	condition	
for	liberal	democracy,	religion	has	not	generally	been	acknowledged	as	a	force	
that	is	essential	for	–	or	even	supportive	of	–	the	development	of	civil	society.	
The	idea	of	civil	society	has	retained	its	eighteenth-century,	Enlightenment	
overtones.	Dutch	history,	however,	provides	arguments	in	favour	of	a	much	
more	positive	assessment	of	religion	and	church	in	the	organization	of	civil	
society.17
1981-2004’, in: Arno Korsten and Peter de Goede 
(eds.), Bouwen aan vertrouwen in het openbaar 
bestuur. Diagnoses en remedies (The Hague 2006) 
61-78; Loek Halman, ‘De politiek vertrouwen? 
Waarom zou je? Een empirische analyse in 33 
Europese landen’, in: Korsten and De Goede, 
Bouwen, 79-99.
17 Nord, ‘Introduction’, xxiv-xxv; Kennedy, 
‘Response’, 129-131; James Kennedy, ‘Die Kirchen 
und die niederländische Gesellschaft. Ein neues 
Verhältnis’, in: Frantz and Kolb, Transnationale 
Zivilgesellschaft, 159-179.
15 Paul Dekker, ‘Europäische Zivilgesellschaften. 
Muster und gemeinsame Perspektiven’, in: 
Christiane Frantz and Holger Kolb (eds.), 
Transnationale Zivilgesellschaft in Europa. 
Traditionen, Muster, Hindernisse, Chancen 
(Münster etc. 2009) 103-120; Rudy B. Andeweg 
and Galen A. Irwin, Governance and Politics of the 
Netherlands (third edition, Basingstoke 2009) 9-15.
16 L.M. Salamon and S.W. Sokolowski et al. (eds.), 
Global Civil Society, volume 2 (Bloomfield 2004); 
Paul Dekker, Loek Halman and Tom van der Meer, 
‘Ontwikkelingen in politiek vertrouwen in Europa, 
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	 Last	but	not	least,	the	Dutch	case	reveals	an	interesting	paradox	in	the	
way	civil	society	and	democracy	relate	to	one	another.	It	may	turn	out	that	a	
well-developed	civil	society	can	entail	a	relatively	tardy,	or	even	incomplete,	
development	of	formal	democracy.	Though	the	Netherlands	is	a	formal	
democracy	since	the	introduction	of	universal	suffrage	in	1919,	there	has	been	
relatively	little	interest	in	the	primacy	of	politics.18	I	will	demonstrate	how	a	
strong	development	of	civil	society	can	eventually	hamper	the	enhancement	
of	political	democracy.	Since	no	outline	of	the	development	of	civil	society	and	
democracy	in	the	Netherlands	has	yet	been	sketched,	I	will	deal	with	these	
three	issues	in	the	course	of	a	historical	account.
Corporatist society as civil society?
Though	the	Dutch	Republic	shared	quite	a	number	of	features	with	the	other	
‘old	regimes’	of	the	early	modern	age,	it	was	a	singular	phenomenon	among	
the	more	or	less	absolutist	monarchies	of	the	period.19	The	Republic	was	a	
highly	decentralized,	commercially	oriented	league	of	towns	and	provinces,	
doing	without	a	head	of	state,	without	a	ruling	aristocracy,	without	a	state	
bureaucracy	in	the	making,	without	the	order	of	the	clergy	and	(except	for	
Frisia	and	the	eastern	provinces)	without	a	nobility	of	any	consequence.	
In	its	social	and	governmental	make-up,	the	Republic	was	a	polity	with	a	
comparatively	‘bourgeois’	character.	It	also	was	a	rather	urbanized	society;	on	
average,	even	the	most	urbanized	region	anywhere	in	Europe	at	the	time.20	In	
The Dutch Republic in the Seventeenth Century 
(Cambridge 2005); Karel Davids and Jan Lucassen 
(eds.), A Miracle Mirrored: The Dutch Republic in 
European Perspective (Cambridge 1995); Willem 
Frijhoff and Marijke Spies (eds.), 1650: Bevochten 
eendracht (The Hague 1999); the same work in 
English translation: 1650: Hard-Won Unity (Assen, 
Basingstoke 2004); Heinz Schilling, Religion, 
Political Culture and the Emergence of Early Modern 
Society: Essays in German and Dutch History 
(Leiden, etc. 1992).
20 Jan de Vries, European Urbanization, 1500-1800 
(Cambridge, Mass. 1984) 39; Karel Davids and 
Jan Lucassen, ‘Introduction’ and ‘Conclusion’, in: 
Davids and Lucassen, Miracle, 1-25 and 428-460; 
Marjolein ’t Hart, ‘The Dutch Republic: The Urban 
Impact upon Politics’, ibidem, 57-98.
18 Andeweg and Irwin, Governance, 256-258 and 
chapter 7; Carla van Baalen, ‘Mehr Demokratie 
– mehr Partizipation? Erfolge und Misserfolge 
auf dem Weg zu mehr Demokratie im 
niederländischen politischen System 1966-2006’, 
Zentrum für Niederlande-Studien. Jahrbuch 19 
(2008) 11-22; James Kennedy, ‘De democratie als 
bestuurskundig probleem. Vernieuwingsstreven 
in de Nederlandse politiek sinds 1918’, Jaarboek 
Parlementaire Geschiedenis 2004. Het democratisch 
ideaal (Nijmegen, The Hague 2004) 12-23. 
19 J.L. Price, Dutch Society, 1588-1713 (Harlow, 
etc. 2000); J.L. Price, Holland and the Dutch 
Republic in the Seventeenth Century: The Politics 
of Particularism (Oxford 1994); Jonathan I. 
Israel, The Dutch Republic: Its Rise, Greatness, 
and Fall 1477-1806 (Oxford 1995); Maarten Prak, 
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the	province	of	Holland,	the	rate	of	urbanization	was	as	high	as	sixty	percent.	
Here,	even	the	countryside	was	directly	connected	to	the	urban	economy.21	
The	Republic	was	part	of	the	vertical	belt	of	small-scale,	commercial,	not	
territorially	expansive	and	non-centralizing	city-states,	stretching	across	
Europe	from	the	Hanseatic	League	down	to	Northern	Italy,	and	occupying	a	
special	position	in	the	state	formation	theories	of	Rokkan	and	Wallerstein.22
	 The	Dutch	towns,	painstakingly	cultivating	their	positions	as	city	
republics,	had	a	high	degree	of	social	organization	and	a	good	few	public	
venues	and	spaces	facilitating	an	urban	social	life	and	association.23	This	
social	organization	consisted	in	the	first	place	of	corporative	or	functional	
bodies,	such	as	craft	guilds	and	urban	militia	companies	(and,	mainly	in	the	
countryside,	district	water	boards).	As	craft	guilds	were	reasonably	accessible,	
the	Republic	numbered	thirteen	hundred-odd	such	institutions	by	1700.	
Guilds	and	town	militias	were	not	voluntary	associations	but	public	bodies,	
which	needed	the	official	assent	of	the	town	magistrate.	Their	prime	function	
was	to	regulate	and	maintain	public	order.	But	apart	from	being	official,	
regulatory	bodies,	the	guilds	and	town	militias	also	served	as	cultural	and	
social	institutions	through	their	public	ceremonies,	festivities	and	prestigious	
lodgings.	They	are	interesting	in	this	respect	from	the	perspective	of	civil	
society.	Guilds	and	town	militias	were	horizontal,	self-governing	associations	
of	(lower)	middle	class	citizens,	which	didn’t	normally	exclude	members	
on	grounds	of	religious	differences.	They	organized	the	interests	of	a	
broad	middle	class	and	boosted	its	solidarity,	social	confidence	and	sense	of	
responsibility.
	 Of	a	more	informal,	yet	socially	basic	nature	were	the	neighbourhood	
associations,	in	which	the	local	residents	arranged	their	mutual	rights,	
obligations	and	assistance	of	their	own	accord.24	These	were	true	grass-roots	
associations,	having	no	need	for	official	consent	and	electing	their	own	boards.	
Local	residents	committed	themselves	by	signing	a	set	of	bye-laws	and	paying	
a	membership	fee.	The	neighbourhood	associations	combined	mutual	aid,	
social	surveillance	and	sociability,	and	organized	the	neighbourhood	watches.	
Though	this	type	of	association	gradually	lost	its	autonomy	in	the	second	
half	of	the	seventeenth	century,	a	strong	sense	of	neighbourhood	community	
appears	to	have	survived	until	well	into	the	nineteenth	century.
22 Stein Rokkan, ‘Dimensions of State Formation 
and Nation Building’, in: Charles Tilly (ed.), The 
Formation of National States in Western Europe 
(Princeton, NJ 1975); Immanuel Wallerstein, The 
Modern World System (2 volumes, New York 1974-
1980). See also ’t Hart, ‘Dutch Republic’, 57-98.
23 Frijhoff and Spies, 1650, 172-175, 204-209.
24 Ibidem, 210-213. 
21 A.M. van der Woude, ‘Demografische 
ontwikkeling van de Noordelijke Nederlanden 
1500-1800’, in: D.P. Blok et al. (eds.), Algemene 
Geschiedenis der Nederlanden (15 volumes, 
Haarlem 1980) volume 5, 134-139; Jan de Vries and 
Ad van der Woude, The First Modern Economy: 
Success, Failure, and Perseverance of the Dutch 
Economy, 1500-1815 (Cambridge 1997).
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The Burgerweeshuis [Civic Orphanage] was founded 
in about 1520. It underwent several expansions and was 
the home for children of citizens with special rights, 
known as ‘poorters’. Today, the Amsterdam Historical 
Museum is housed where these orphans once lived. A 
woman leads in two children in rags and tatters while, 
on the left, the matron waits with new clothes. These 
consisted of the red and black uniform of the orphans 
which made them a familiar sight in the streets of 
Amsterdam. Adriaen Backer, Four Governesses and a 
Female Warden of the Civic Orphanage, 1683. 
Amsterdams Historisch Museum (on loan from Sociaal 
Agogisch Centrum het Burgerweeshuis, Photo René 
Gerritsen).
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	 Furthermore,	the	cities	accommodated	an	elaborate	system	of	civic	
poor	relief,	charitable	institutions	and	welfare	endowments,	taking	care	of	
orphans	and	the	disabled,	the	elderly	and	destitute	citizens.	This	abundance	
of	charitable	institutions	was	provided	for	by	the	religious	communities	and	
their	churches,	and	partly	by	the	municipal	authorities.	Although	Roman	
Catholics,	the	dissenting	protestant	sects	and	Jews	were	only	tolerated	and	
were	officially	denied	a	public	role,	they	were	in	fact	allowed	to	provide	
this	kind	of	care	for	their	own	communities.	In	some	larger	cities,	they	even	
maintained	quite	distinguished	buildings	to	this	end.	A	position	within	a	
charitable	institution	or	welfare	endowment,	be	it	as	a	regent	or	otherwise,	
conferred	social	prestige	to	its	holder.	To	maintain	a	dense	system	of	
charitable	institutions	was	a	matter	of	civic	pride	and	competition,	between	
the	cities	themselves	and	between	the	religious	communities	within	each	city.	
	 The	fact	that	the	urban	communities	displayed	a	considerable	degree	
of	civic	association	and	self-confidence	made	the	Republic	by	no	means	an	
early	democracy.	At	all	levels	of	government,	power	rested	with	a	patriciate	of	
burgher	Regents.	The	successive	Stadtholders,	always	members	of	the	house	
of	Orange,	formally	were	officials	subservient	to	the	States	of	the	sovereign	
provinces,	but	in	stages	(1674-1675,	1747-1748)	they	rose	to	an	independent	
position	of	power	which	enabled	them	to	outclass	the	Regent	oligarchy	and	to	
take	over	its	patronage	in	parts	of	the	country.	Nowhere	was	the	formal	right	
to	political	representation	deeply	embedded;	probably	no	more	than	half	of	
one	percent	of	the	adult	male	population	was	eligible	for	election	or	had	the	
vote:	a	much	lower	figure	than	in	England.25	Though	the	urban	citizenry	
professed	the	ideology	of	‘urban	republicanism’	–	implying	that	citizens	had	
established	rights,	liberties	and	obligations,	either	recorded	or	not	–	in	actual	
practice,	the	business	of	government	was	left	entirely	to	the	Regents.	Only	
in	1780-1787	was	oligarchic	rule	fundamentally	contested,	earlier	periods	of	
unrest	notwithstanding.26
	 Given	this	history,	and	given	the	standards	of	Habermas’s	ideal	of	a	
free	public	sphere	and	the	nineteenth-century	type	of	voluntary	association,	
it	is	difficult	to	recognize	a	civil	society	or	a	rudimentary	stage	of	democracy	
in	the	corporatist	order	of	the	Dutch	Republic.	Indeed,	the	guilds,	militias,	
neighbourhood	associations	and	church-related	charitable	institutions	did	
not	constitute	a	free	domain	of	civic	association.	In	part,	these	acted	as	an	
Republic: The Patriot Movement of the 1780s’, 
Theory and Society 20 (1991) 73-102; Maarten Prak, 
Republikeinse veelvoud, democratisch enkelvoud. 
Sociale verandering in het Revolutietijdvak, 
’s-Hertogenbosch 1770-1820 (Nijmegen 1999) 
chapter 8.
25 Schilling, Religion, 327-329; Henk van Nierop, 
‘Popular Participation in Politics in the 
Dutch Republic’, in: Peter Blickle, Resistance, 
Representation, and Community (Oxford 1997) 272-
290.
26 Van Nierop, ‘Popular Participation’; Maarten Prak, 
‘Citizen Radicalism and Democracy in the Dutch 
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extension	of	the	local	authorities;	the	poor	relief	served	an	economic	goal	
by	maintaining	a	cheap	labour	pool.	But	at	the	same	time,	these	institutions	
unmistakably	constituted	an	early	and	vital	demonstration	of	civic	and	social	
self-organization.	Citizens	took	responsibility	for	their	neighbourhood,	their	
religious	community	and	their	town.	This	corporatist	sociability	was	not	
elitist,	and	was	often	non-denominational.	Being	outside	of	local	government,	
the	guilds,	urban	militias	and	neighbourhood	associations	could	–	and	did	
–	act	as	unofficial	representative	bodies	or	interest	groups.	They	regarded	
themselves	as	the	core	of	the	citizenry,	hinting	at	a	tacit	popular	sovereignty	
they	represented.	They	voiced	their	interests	through	requests	and	petitions,	
and	not	without	success:	probably	three	quarters	of	all	requests	were	
granted.27	The	urban	authorities,	for	their	part,	depended	on	the	organized	
citizenry	for	the	preservation	of	public	order.	Because	of	its	lively	public	
debate,	the	urban	society	of	the	Dutch	Republic	has	been	characterized	as	
a	‘discussion	culture’.28	Although	formal	participation	in	government	was	
denied	to	the	community,	a	pragmatic	culture	of	bargaining	between	citizens	
and	authorities	gradually	arose,	aimed	at	problem-solving,	channelling	
interests	and	conflicts,	and	socialization.	
The new sociability
Alongside	these	forms	of	association,	a	different	type	of	cultural	sociability	
had	emerged;	one	with	a	rather	private	character	and	that	did	not	serve	any	
public	function.	Early	modern	society	had	known	fraternities,	brotherhoods	
and	chambers	of	rhetoric.	Research	is	not	conclusive	as	to	the	continuity	of	
these	forms	of	association.	Some	forms	may	have	died	out	in	the	course	of	
the	seventeenth	century,	but	there	is	evidence	too	that	musical	companies,	
chambers	of	rhetoric,	brotherhoods,	conventicles	and	other	gatherings	in	
a	private	sphere	remained	a	common	feature	at	this	time.29	This	type	of	
sociability	arose	from	private	initiative	and	could	survive	thanks	to	the	space	
the	public	authorities	left	for	people	to	associate	without	official	consent.	
Since	this	space	was	relatively	broad,	the	practice	of	free	social	association	
leven te Rotterdam (The Hague 1999); Joost Kloek 
and Wijnand Mijnhardt, 1800: Blauwdrukken 
voor een samenleving (The Hague 2001) 107. Also 
available in English: 1800: Blueprints for a National 
Community (Assen and Basingstoke 2004).
27 Van Nierop, ‘Popular Participation’, 287.
28 Frijhoff and Spies, 1650, 218-224.
29 Cf. Frijhoff and Spies, 1650, 216-218; J.M. 
Zijlmans, Vriendenkringen in de zeventiende eeuw. 
Verenigingsvormen van het informele culturele 
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appeared	in	the	Dutch	Republic	well	before	1700:	at	about	the	same	period	it	
did	in	some	German	towns,	in	England	and	in	Scotland,	but	more	than	half	a	
century	earlier	than	in	France.30	
	 Sociability	outside	of	corporative	associations	was	initially	a	small-
scale	activity,	chiefly	being	cultivated	in	circles	of	patricians	and	humanist	
scholars	within	their	private	homes.31	The	proliferation	of	sociability	in	a	new,	
enlightened	form,	took	flight	after	1730	in	the	provinces	of	Holland,	Zeeland	
and	Utrecht.	After	1770,	the	other	provinces	followed,	with	the	exception	of	
the	Roman	Catholic	provinces	of	Brabant	and	Limburg	in	the	South.	The	novel	
spirit	of	association	was	expressed	in	the	foundation	of	numerous	learned	
societies,	literary	societies,	reading	societies,	Masonic	lodges	and	amateur	
scientific	societies,	and	in	the	two	last	decades	of	the	eighteenth	century	also	
in	the	formation	of	societies	for	the	advancement	of	national	reform	and	
in	political	clubs.	The	movement	was	inspired	by	the	Lockean	idea,	made	
popular	through	the	spectatorial	press,	that	people	will	improve	in	knowledge,	
reason	and	virtue	through	interchange	and	cooperation.	If	people	were	
willing	to	encourage,	to	educate	and	to	correct	one	another,	sociability	would	
advance	civilization.32	Under	certain	conditions,	women	too	could	partake	
in	sociability.33	As	all	these	societies	drew	up	bye-laws	and	ardently	enforced	
these,	membership	was	also	an	exercise	in	discipline	and	responsibility.
	 Enlightened	sociability	spread	with	the	popularity	of	the	Spectator-
type	of	weekly	or	fortnightly	periodicals	that	started	in	England	in	the	
early	eighteenth	century,	and	was	soon	adopted	on	the	Continent,	mainly	in	
German	cities	and	in	the	Netherlands.	More	than	seventy	Dutch	titles	are	on	
record,	published	in	the	course	of	half	a	century.	The	most	successful	such	
‘spectators’	sold	a	few	hundred	–	in	some	cases	even	a	few	thousand	–	copies,	
but	their	readership	was	considerably	larger,	as	they	were	frequently	reprinted	
and	circulated	around	reading	societies	and	coffee	houses.	Together,	these	
periodicals	created	a	virtual	community	of	readers	exchanging	practical,	
religious	and	moral	issues,	and	assessments	of	their	fellow	citizens’	manners	
32 W.W. Mijnhardt, ‘Sociabiliteit en 
cultuurparticipatie in de achttiende en vroege 
negentiende eeuw’, in: M.G. Westen (ed.), Met 
den tooverstaf van ware kunst. Cultuurspreiding en 
cultuuroverdracht in historisch perspectief (Leiden 
1990) 37-69, in particular 47; Marleen de Vries, 
Beschaven! Letterkundige genootschappen in 
Nederland 1750-1800 (Nijmegen 2001).
33 C. Baar-de Weerd, Uw sekse en de onze. Vrouwen 
en genootschappen in Nederland en in de ons 
omringende landen (1750-ca. 1810) (Hilversum 
2009).
30 According to Kloek and Mijnhardt, 1800, 106-108; 
also stated by Anton van de Sande, ‘Inleiding’, in: 
Anton van de Sande and Joost Rosendaal (eds.), 
‘Een stille leerschool van deugd en goede zeden’. 
Vrijmetselarij in Nederland in de 18de en 19de eeuw 
(Hilversum 1995) 12-13.
31 André Hanou, ‘Het letterkundig genootschap 
in de Nederlanden’, in: Guillaume van Gemert 
and Frans Korsten (eds.), Orbis doctus, 1500-1850. 
Perspectieven op de geleerde wereld van Europa. 
Plaatsen en personen (Amsterdam, Utrecht 2005) 
133-148.
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Paulus Constantijn la Fargue, Interior of the Hall of the 
Society ‘Kunst wordt door Arbeid verkregen’ [‘Art is 
Achieved Through Labour’] in Leiden, 1780. 
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
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and	conduct.34	The	rapid	expansion	of	the	press,	together	with	the	new	type	
of	societies	and	clubs,	extended	the	public	domain	people	lived	in.35	Initially	
this	new	public	sphere	was	not	hostile	towards	the	established	order.	It	rather	
implied	an	ambitious	attempt	at	socialization,	or	the	realization	of	something	
that	might	best	be	called	‘burgherhood’,	as	it	neither	completely	coincided	
with	‘citizenship’,	nor	with	middle-class	culture.	
	 In	combination	with	the	spectatorial	press,	enlightened	sociability	
introduced	a	new	understanding	of	citizenship.	The	old	legal	concept	of	
town	burghership,	the	classic	republican	idea	of	politically	active	citizenship	
and	the	social	status	qualification	‘middle	sort’	or	‘middle	class’	were	being	
transcended	by	a	concept	of	social	and	moral	citizenship.	Virtues	such	as	self-
control,	culture	and	usefulness	were	central	to	this	programme,	which	people	
from	all	walks	of	life	could	subscribe	to	(at	least	in	principle).	Denied	political	
representation,	citizens	turned	to	this	programme	of	social	and	moral	
citizenship.	According	to	one	of	the	‘spectators’	(De Borger),	a	good	citizen	was	
one	‘who	does	his	part	to	contribute	to	the	perfection	of	the	civil	society’.36	
The	concept	of	citizenship	became	increasingly	complicated.37	It	had	a	
republican	tenor:	regardless	of	their	station,	profession	or	persuasion,	citizens	
were	members	of	the	‘borgerlyke	maatschappij’	(civil	society),	but	this	referred	
to	the	polity,	the	political	community	or	‘gemeenebest’	(commonwealth,	
republic).	At	least	until	the	1780s,	however,	citizenship	implied	no	claim	to	
political	or	democratic	rights.	The	proper	stage	for	the	citizen	in	which	to	be	
active	as	civis	was	society.	The	language	of	the	‘spectators’	created	something	
of	a	non-political	republican	citizenship:	the	societal	republican.	It	is	here	that	
37 For a discussion of the concept of ‘burger(schap)’ 
in the second half of the eighteenth century, 
see: Wyger Velema, ‘Beschaafde republikeinen. 
Burgers in de achttiende eeuw’, in: Remieg Aerts 
and Henk te Velde (eds.), De stijl van de burger. 
Over Nederlandse burgerlijke cultuur vanaf de 
middeleeuwen (Kampen 1998) 80-99; Joost Kloek 
and Wijnand Mijnhardt, ‘De Verlichte burger’, 
in: Joost Kloek and Karin Tilmans (eds.), Burger. 
Een geschiedenis van het begrip ‘burger’ in de 
Nederlanden van de middeleeuwen tot de 21ste eeuw 
(Amsterdam 2002) 155-172, in particular 158-159; 
Kloek and Mijnhardt, 1800, chapters 10-11; Cf. 
Van Sas, ‘Netherlands’, 55 and N.C.F. van Sas, De 
metamorfose van Nederland. Van oude orde naar 
moderniteit, 1750-1900 (Amsterdam 2004) chapter 
22.
34 P.J. Buijnsters, Spectatoriale geschriften (Utrecht 
1991); Nicolaas van Sas, ‘The Netherlands, 1750-
1813’, in: Hannah Barker and Simon Burrows 
(eds.), Press, Politics and the Public Sphere in 
Europe and North America, 1760-1820 (Cambridge 
2002) 48-68; Dorothée Sturkenboom, 
Spectators van hartstocht. Sekse en emotionele 
cultuur in de achttiende eeuw (Hilversum 1998); 
Wolfgang Martens, Die Botschaft der Tugend. Die 
Aufklärung im Spiegel der deutschen Moralischen 
Wochenschriften (Stuttgart 1968). 
35 Van Sas, ‘Netherlands’, 48-68, in particular 52.
36 De Borger (Utrecht 1778-1780) no. 2, quoted 
in: A. Hietbrink, ‘De deugden van een vrije 
republiek. Opvattingen over beschaafdheid 
in de achttiende-eeuwse Republiek’, in: P. den 
Boer (ed.), Beschaving. Een geschiedenis van de 
begrippen hoofsheid, heusheid, beschaving en cultuur 
(Amsterdam 2001) 197-211, quotation 207. 
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the	concept	of	‘society’	as	a	separate	realm	makes	its	appearance.	At	the	same	
time,	a	new	idea	of	a	national	community	beyond	the	local	and	provincial	
level	emerged	from	the	spectatorial	dissertations	on	the	civil	society.	This	
concept	gave	rise	to	the	establishment	of	the	first	voluntary	association	to	go	
on	to	become	a	long-lasting	national	institution:	the	Maatschappij	tot	Nut	van	
’t	Algemeen	[Society	for	the	Advancement	of	the	Common	Good,	1784].38	
	 During	the	1780s,	both	the	new	civil	sociability	and	the	old	corporative	
institutions	underwent	a	rapid	and	heated	politicization.	The	so-called	
Patriot	Revolt,	prompted	by	a	widely-felt	concern	about	the	apparent	decline	
of	the	Republic	after	the	losing	of	an	Anglo-Dutch	naval	battle	in	1780,	was	
basically	a	movement	of	middle-class	citizens	who	wanted	to	recover	the	
former	prosperity	and	glory	of	the	Republic,	and	blamed	the	Stadtholder	for	
having	bartered	this	away.	The	Patriot	movement	showed	a	mixture	of	old-
school	civic	republicanism	and	new	democratic	ideals.	The	revived	spirit	of	
republicanism	incited	citizens	to	join	the	urban	militias,	to	present	claims	
for	political	reform	and	to	demand	real	influence	on	public	affairs.	A	novel	
political	press	emerged	and	many	societies	transformed	into	political	clubs.
	 Having	come	to	a	head	by	1787,	the	Patriot	revolt	was	crushed	by	
Prussian	forces	rallying	to	the	aid	of	Stadtholder	William	V.	But	after	a	seven	
year	period	of	Orangist	restoration,	the	Patriot	movement	revived	in	the	
revolutionary	Batavian	Republic,	resulting	from	a	new	take-over	in	1795	
backed	by	French	revolutionary	armies	invading	the	Low	Countries.	For	a	
few	years,	a	contemporary,	natural-law	based	democratic	discourse	extolling	
equality,	liberty	and	fraternity	(in	that	order)	engulfed	the	Batavian	Republic.	
Free	elections,	broad-based	male	suffrage	and	referenda	were	introduced.	
Women	found	recognition	as	‘burgeres’	[female	citizens].39	A	democratically	
elected	National	Assembly,	representing	the	‘Batavian	people’,	took	over	the	
princely	quarters	at	The	Hague.	In	1798,	a	Jacobin	Batavian	constitution	
remoulded	the	old	federation	into	a	single	Batavian	state,	and	issued	full	
citizenship	to	‘all	members	of	society’,	regardless	of	their	station	or	religion.40	
(ed.) (Nijmegen 2005) 60; E.H. Kossmann, ‘The 
Crisis of the Dutch State 1780-1813: Nationalism, 
Federalism, Unitarism’, in: J.S. Bromley and E.H. 
Kossmann (eds.), Britain and the Netherlands, 
volume IV. Metropolis, Dominion and Province: 
Papers delivered to the fourth Anglo-Dutch 
Historical Conference (The Hague 1971) 156-175; 
Simon Schama, Patriots and Liberators: Revolution 
in The Netherlands, 1780-1813 (New York 1977). 
A recent synthesis of the Batavian Republic is 
offered by Annie Jourdan, La Révolution batave. 
Entre la France et l’Amérique (1795-1806) (Rennes 
2008).
38 W.W. Mijnhardt, Tot heil van ’t menschdom. 
Culturele genootschappen in Nederland, 1750-
1815 (Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA 1987); W.W. 
Mijnhardt and A.J. Wichers (eds.), Om het 
algemeen volksgeluk. Twee eeuwen particulier 
initiatief 1784-1984. Gedenkboek ter gelegenheid van 
het tweehonderdjarig bestaan van de Maatschappij 
tot Nut van ’t Algemeen (Edam 1984).  
39 M. Everard and M. Aerts, ‘De burgeres. 
Geschiedenis van een politiek begrip’, in: Kloek 
and Tilmans, Burger, 173-229.
40 Staatsregeling voor het Bataafsche Volk, 1798. De 
eerste grondwet van Nederland, Joost Rosendaal 
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R. Vinkeles and D. Vrijdag (after J. Bulthuis), The Session 
of the First National Assembly, 1796. 
Atlas Van Stolk, Museum Het Schielandshuis, 
Rotterdam.
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In	the	wake	of	changing	French	policies	since	the	Napoleonic	takeover,	
however,	these	democratic	experiments	were	replaced	by	an	increasingly	
executive	rule.	French	domination	brought	long-lasting	effects	such	as	a	
unitary	state	and	intensified	national	feeling;	but	it	also	brought	an	end	to	a	
strong	sense	of	political	citizenship.
Distant politics, civil society and religion
An	independent	Dutch	state	returned	under	the	direction	of	Britain	and	
the	Vienna	Congress,	set	up	as	a	standard	Restoration	monarchy	under	
King	William	I	of	Orange,	the	son	of	the	ousted	Stadtholder,	William	V.	The	
Kingdom	of	1814-1815	had	a	constitution	and	two-Chamber	representation,	
but	any	suggestion	of	democracy	or	popular	sovereignty	was	rigorously	
eliminated.	The	Restoration	order	rendered	the	public	sphere	empty,	reticent,	
and	depoliticized.	‘Abstinence	was	deemed	a	civic	duty’,	as	the	liberal	leader	
J.R.	Thorbecke	scornfully	summarized	the	pre-1848	era.41	With	the	abolition	
of	the	old	corporative	bodies	during	the	French	period	and	the	dismantling	of	
urban	autonomy,	a	precondition	for	social	organization	and	voicing	interests	
had	disappeared,	although	a	small-town	setting	remained	the	normal	habitat	
of	social	life.	There	was	still	the	widespread	sociability	of	literary	societies,	
reading	societies,	clubs,	Masonic	lodges	and	the	like,	but	these	associations	
scrupulously	steered	clear	of	politics.	Even	if	there	was	not	a	particularly	
restrictive	press	regime,	newspapers	and	periodicals	generally	chose	to	avoid	
controversial	issues.	The	public	mind	of	the	Restoration	period	praised	the	
alleged	national	virtue	of	‘domestic	life’,	and	promoted	Christian	love	over	
criticism.	Society	was	conceived	of	as	a	family-like	order	comprising	all	
walks	of	life,	under	the	benevolent	rule	of	the	king.	William	I’s	policy	was	to	
place	the	churches	and	benevolent	societies	under	indirect	state	supervision,	
and	to	assign	them	a	responsibility	for	maintaining	social	harmony	and	
disseminating	morality	and	nationhood.42	The	monarchical	state	of	the	first	
half	of	the	nineteenth	century	may	not	have	been	very	impressive	by	modern	
standards,	but	it	was	an	unusual	episode	in	Dutch	history	in	that	the	state	
seized	the	initiative	in	supervising	public	life.
42 Nicolaj Bijleveld, Voor God, Volk en Vaderland. 
De plaats van de hervormde predikant binnen 
de nationale eenwordingsprocessen in Nederland 
in de eerste helft van de negentiende eeuw 
(Delft 2007); Emo Bos, Soevereiniteit en Religie. 
Godsdienstvrijheid onder de eerste Oranjevorsten 
(Hilversum 2009).
41 J.R. Thorbecke, Historische schetsen (second 
edition, The Hague 1872) 174; C.A. Tamse and 
E. Witte, Staats- en natievorming in Willem I’s 
koninkrijk (1815-1830) (Brussels, Baarn 1992); Jeroen 
van Zanten, Schielijk, Winzucht, Zwaarhoofd en 
Bedaard. Politieke discussie en oppositievorming 1813-
1840 (Amsterdam 2004); Van Sas, Metamorfose, 
chapters 23-26.
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	 To	form	or	join	an	organization	was	not	usually	problematic,	but	the	
formal	right	of	association	and	assembly	was	not	expressly	guaranteed	in	
the	1814-1815	constitutions,	as	this	was	deemed	unnecessary	in	view	of	the	
liberal	traditions	of	the	nation.	Until	1848,	the	Napoleonic	Code	Pénal	articles	
291-294	remained	in	force,	prescribing	that	societies	and	associations	needed	
government	consent.	In	actual	practice,	this	legal	provision	was	only	enforced	
if	social	order	seemed	threatened:	for	instance	in	1834,	when	a	radical	
religious	group	broke	away	from	the	Dutch	Reformed	church	to	set	up	as	an	
independent	church	(the	Afscheiding).43	The	right	of	association	and	assembly	
was	eventually	established	in	1848,	when	a	liberal	reform	of	the	constitution	
was	conceded	in	order	to	avoid	the	Netherlands	being	dragged	into	the	
revolutionary	turmoil	seizing	Europe.	The	liberal	constitutional	committee,	
presided	over	by	Leiden	professor	Thorbecke,	explicitly	aimed	to	activate	
the	burgerij	–	indicating	both	‘the	middle	classes’	and	‘the	citizenry’	–	and	to	
obtain	from	it	a	public	commitment.44	To	this	end,	the	1848	constitution	not	
only	established	direct	suffrage	but	also	whole-heartedly	subscribed	to	the	
principle	of	voluntary	association,	although	in	the	final	version	a	provision	
was	laid	down	to	secure	public	order,	with	the	rather	obvious	purport	of	
preventing	religious	agitation.45	Though	the	formation	of	trade	unions	was	
hampered	until	1872	by	French	legislation	against	workers’	coalitions	still	
being	in	force,	the	authorities	left	associations	of	petty	bourgeois	artisans	and	
self-help	initiatives	undisturbed.46	The	more	or	less	liberal	governments	in	
power	after	1848	never	took	recourse	to	legal	restrictions	to	hinder	political	
association.	Whereas	the	revolutions	of	1848-1849	ended	in	a	period	of	
repression	in	most	countries,	the	peaceful	constitutional	reform	in	the	
Netherlands	established	the	right	of	association.	
	 Whether	legally	endorsed	or	not,	the	level	of	organization	in	Dutch	
society	remained	high.	One	author	mapping	in	1851	the	system	of	church-
related,	private	and	government-sponsored	charity,	benevolent,	educational,	
moral	reform	and	poor	relief	institutions	that	were	active	in	Amsterdam	
alone,	needed	a	volume	of	five	hundred	densely	printed	pages	to	achieve	
1938); E. van Raalte, Het recht van vereeniging en 
vergadering in Nederland (Alphen aan den Rijn 
1939), cf. Peter Jan Margry, Teedere quaesties: 
religieuze rituelen in conflict. Confrontaties tussen 
katholieken en protestanten rond de processiecultuur 
in 19de-eeuws Nederland (Hilversum 2000). 
46 G. Harmsen, ‘De arbeiders en hun 
vakorganisaties’, in: F.L. van Holthoon (ed.), 
De Nederlandse samenleving sinds 1815 (Assen, 
Maastricht 1985) 261-282, 263.
43 Bos, Soevereiniteit, chapter 7.
44 Verslag der commissie, bij besluit van 17 maart j.l. 
benoemd tot voordragt van een volledig ontwerp van 
grondwetsherziening (The Hague 1848).
45 C.J.H. Jansen, ‘Klassieke grondrechten. 
Achtergrond en ontwikkeling, 1795-1917’, in: 
N.C.F. van Sas and H. te Velde (eds.), De eeuw van 
de grondwet. Grondwet en politiek in Nederland, 
1798-1917 (Deventer 1998) 96-112, 105-106; H.IJ. 
IJnzonides, Het recht van vergadering (Zwolle 
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Amicitiae, Undated.
Rijksmuseum, Amsterdam.
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this.47	Each	of	the	more	than	twenty	acknowledged	religious	communities	ran	
their	own	organizations	providing	poor	relief,	charity,	education	and	reform.	
There	were	many	private,	non-ecclesiastical	initiatives	too.	Most	towns	could	
boast	such	a	profusion	of	charity	organizations,	run	by	(upper)	middle-class	
citizens.	Characteristic	of	this	long	Dutch	tradition	of	charity	is	the	mixture	of	
social	control,	civic	self-affirmation,	Christian	inspiration	and	genuine	social	
involvement	it	demonstrated.
	 The	‘spirit	of	association’	practiced	in	gentlemen’s	clubs,	reading,	
amateur	scientific,	choral,	musical	and	recitation	societies	was	thought	to	
be	a	national	feature.48	It	is	estimated	that	there	were	more	than	a	thousand	
reading	societies	in	the	first	half	of	the	nineteenth	century,	and	a	similar	
number	of	recitation	societies	is	on	record.	Choral	societies	too	appear	to	
have	enjoyed	a	widespread	popularity,	and	not	only	in	middle-class	circles.	
Perhaps	ten	to	fifteen	percent	of	the	population	participated	in	cultural	
sociability.49	Dutch	society	of	the	age	may	have	looked	strangely	egalitarian	to	
foreign	visitors,	but	actually	it	was	a	rather	static	order,	composed	of	‘circles’	
and	subtle	social	distinctions.	It	is	assumed	that	most	types	of	voluntary	
association	had	a	predominantly	(upper)	middle-class	membership.	The	
programme	of	middle-class	values	and	sociability	was	in	principle	inclusive,	
but	in	fact	it	tended	to	exclude	women,	lower-class	people,	Roman	Catholics	
and	especially	Jews.	In	the	first	half	of	the	nineteenth	century,	voluntary	
associations	probably	comprised	a	smaller	and	more	elitist	section	of	the	
population	than	Old	Regime	urban	corporatism	had.50	Still,	the	practice	of	
sociability	spread	after	1840,	and	even	more	after	1870,	reaching	lower	social	
classes	too.	At	the	turn	of	the	century,	a	medium-sized	city	such	as	Haarlem	
numbered	about	five	hundred	associations,	some	of	these	having	a	good	
thousand	members.51
49 De Vries, ‘Voluntary Societies’, 10-116; Dick Jansen, 
‘Uitgerekend op intekening. De kwantitatieve 
ontwikkeling van het leesgezelschap in 
Nederland, 1781-1850’, dne 14:2-3 (1990) 181-188; 
Westers, Welsprekende burgers, chapters 2, 8, 9, 
10; Josef Vos, Democratisering van de schoonheid. 
Twee eeuwen scholing in de kunsten (Nijmegen 
1999) chapters 2, 5; dne 7:2 (1983) special issue on 
voluntary associations 1800-1850.
50 Cf. De Vries, ‘Voluntary Associations’, 107-108.
51 Ibidem, 114.
47 N.S. Calisch, Liefdadigheid te Amsterdam. 
Overzigt van al hetgeen er in Amsterdam wordt 
verrigt, ter bevordering van de stoffelijke, zedelijke 
en godsdienstige belangen, voornamelijk der 
minvermogenden en behoeftigen (Amsterdam 1851); 
Marco H.D. van Leeuwen, The Logic of Charity: 
Amsterdam 1800-1850 (Basingstoke, New York 
2000).
48 J. van Hall (1855), quoted in: W. van den Berg, 
‘Het literaire genootschapsleven in de eerste helft 
van de negentiende eeuw’, dne 7:2 (1983) 146-178, 
quotation: 168.
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	 An	interesting	new	phenomenon	was	the	reform	movements	emerging	
about	1840,	inspired	by	British	and	American	models.	These	single-issue	
movements,	advocating	the	abolition	of	slavery,	prostitution	or	the	stamp	
tax,	or	promoting	temperance	and	morality,	were	meant	to	act	on	public	
opinion.	Contrary	to	most	cultural	societies,	which	generally	had	a	semi-
private	character,	these	reform	organizations	were	directed	outwards.	While	
only	intending	to	influence	social	consciousness,	their	actions	contributed	
to	raising	political	opinion	at	a	time	when	there	were	as	yet	no	political	
parties.	However,	even	these	organizations	had	a	mainly	(upper)	middle-class	
following.	Comprising	a	few	thousand	supporters,	they	were	nothing	like	
the	English	and	American	mass	movements;	neither	did	they	aspire	to	be.	It	
was	not	their	intention	to	stir	mass	feelings.	Through	their	modest	conduct,	
they	wanted	to	conform	to	the	style	of	the	upper	middle-class	political	
establishment.52
	 The	reform	movements	draw	attention	to	the	fact	that	religion	
constituted	a	strong	incentive	to	partake	in	social	activity.	Sociability	had	long	
been	dominated	by	upper	middle-class	citizens	of	a	liberal,	Dutch	Reformed	
persuasion.	A	rather	middle-of-the-road	Christian	frame	of	mind	was	part	and	
parcel	of	the	nineteenth-century	concept	of	citizenship.	After	1850	however,	
orthodox	Protestants	also	started	to	associate.	From	the	rapidly	expanding	
evangelical	youth	movement,	they	set	up	a	nationwide	web	of	organized	
orthodox	Protestants	engaging	in	all	kinds	of	social	activities.	Although	
orthodox	Protestants	principally	repudiated	both	the	modern	world	and	
alternative	religious	creeds,	their	religious	zeal	was	in	fact	conducive	to	taking	
on	a	more	public	role	and	intensifying	their	social	participation.53	Roman	
Catholics,	too,	began	to	organize	within	their	community.	The	widespread	
disaffection	of	confessional	communities	with	the	liberal	education	policy	
prompted	a	mass	petition	movement	in	1878,	mobilizing	‘the	nation	behind	
the	voters’.	As	was	demonstrated	in	1853,	when	two	hundred	thousand	
Protestants	petitioned	against	the	Roman	Catholic	church	organization	
being	restored,	religious	issues	were	the	most	powerful	incentive	for	political	
action.54
54 Jurjen Vis and Wim Janse (eds.), Staf en storm. Het 
herstel van de bisschoppelijke hiërarchie in Nederland 
in 1853: actie en reactie (Hilversum 2002); George 
Harinck, Roel Kuiper and Peter Bak (eds.), De 
Antirevolutionaire Partij, 1829-1980 (Hilversum 
2001).
52 Maartje Janse, De afschaffers. Publieke opinie, 
organisatie en politiek in Nederland 1840-1880 
(Amsterdam 2007).
53 Annemarie Houkes, Christelijke vaderlanders. 
Godsdienst, burgerschap en de Nederlandse natie, 
1850-1900 (Amsterdam 2009); Hanneke Hoekstra, 
Het hart van de natie. Morele verontwaardiging 
en politieke verandering in Nederland 1870-1919 
(Amsterdam 2005).
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	 After	1870,	a	process	of	social	association	according	to	confessional	
alignment	started,	which	was	to	dominate	Dutch	politics	and	society	until	
well	into	the	1960s.	Organized	sociability	was	expanding	and	opening	up	
to	new	groups.	At	the	same	time,	political	organization	and	participation	
rose	to	a	higher	level.	Politicization	and	the	democratization	of	sociability	
were	accompanied	by	an	expanding	and	diversifying	press.	After	the	repeal	
of	the	stamp	tax	in	1869,	the	number	of	newspapers	and	periodicals	rose	
impressively.	Around	1850,	there	had	been	ninety-two	periodicals	and	nine	
newspapers	with	a	total	circulation	under	a	hundred	thousand.	At	the	turn	
of	the	century,	some	thousand	periodicals	and	more	than	seventy	newspapers	
were	being	published,	reaching	well	over	a	million	readers	out	of	a	total	
population	of	five	million.55	Newspapers	and	periodicals	have	the	capacity	
to	connect	readers	and	to	turn	people	with	common	interests	or	views	on	
life	into	a	virtual	community.	Above,	amongst	and	across	the	multitude	of	
voluntary	associations	and	citizens’	organizations,	the	press	both	unites	and	
shapes	communities,	and	therefore	is	of	vital	importance	to	a	civil	society.	In	
the	Dutch	case,	both	the	press	and	sociability	had	a	small-scale,	close-knit	and	
nation-wide	structure.	
The subservient democracy
The	expansion	and	heightening	of	social	organization	about	1900	and	during	
the	first	part	of	the	twentieth	century	took	the	form	known	as	‘pillarization’.56	
Being	able	to	organize	in	isolation	made	it	possible	for	orthodox	Protestants	
and	Roman	Catholics	to	shepherd	their	confessional	life	principles	through	
the	moral	perils	of	the	modern	age.	To	the	socialist	workers’	movement,	a	
policy	of	edification	and	enhancing	discipline	within	their	own	ranks	served	
as	a	means	to	command	respect,	to	shame	the	corrupted	bourgeoisie,	and	
to	give	an	imposing	demonstration	of	unity	and	power.	Being	part	of	an	
emancipating	community	subjected	people	to	the	moral	and	social	discipline	
exerted	by	their	‘confederates	of	faith’,	reminiscent	of	Ernest	Gellner’s	
‘tyranny	of	cousins’.57	People	were	free	to	join,	but	there	was	limited	room	
for	choice.	While	opening	up	to	new	social	strata,	the	public	sphere	broke	up	
into	compartments	in	the	course	of	the	process.	The	confessional	communities	
and	the	socialists	aimed	for	recognition	and	emancipation	as	a	group.	As	a	
result,	Dutch	society	was	imbued	with	discipline	and	social	convention	until	
57 Piet de Rooy, Openbaring en openbaarheid 
(Amsterdam 2009) 40; E. Gellner, Conditions of 
Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals (London 1994) 7.
55 Figures in: Huub Wijfjes, Journalistiek in Nederland 
1850-2000. Beroep, cultuur en organisatie 
(Amsterdam 2004) 19.
56 See the article by James Kennedy on religion in 
this issue.
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well	into	the	1960s.	Having	been	a	‘deferential	society’	up	to	the	end	of	the	
nineteenth	century	as	a	consequence	of	socio-economic	inequality	and	the	
system	of	charity,	Dutch	society	entered	a	new	period	of	conduct-regulation	
as	a	consequence	of	collective	emancipation.	Even	the	non-sectarian	media	
shared	in	this	culture	and	generally	demonstrated	a	restrained	attitude.58	
The	system	of	pillarization	may	have	restricted	the	individual,	but	the	sense	
of	security	provided	by	the	circle	of	sympathizers	strongly	encouraged	
people	to	join	and	to	organize.	As	a	result,	civil	association	in	all	domains	
of	life	–	be	it	cultural	activities,	sports,	hobbies,	or	politics	–	rose	to	a	very	
high	level.	By	holding	office	on	a	committee,	in	a	trade	union	or	on	a	local	
council,	newcomers	acquired	experience	and	gained	confidence	in	assuming	
responsibility	and	running	an	institution.59	Through	the	roundabout	route	of	
association	in	segregation,	pillarization	turned	out	to	be	an	alternative	route	
to	national	integration.	
	 The	formation	of	confessional	subcultures	was	given	an	ideological	
foundation	in	1880,	when	the	neo-Calvinist	clergyman	and	political	leader	
Abraham	Kuyper	formulated	the	principle	of	‘sovereignty	in	one’s	own	
circle’.	The	papal	encyclicals	Immortale Dei	(1885),	Rerum novarum	(1891)	
and	Quadragesimo Anno (1931) developed	a	Roman-Catholic	social	theory	on	
principles	such	as	the	‘societas	perfecta’	and	‘subsidiarity’.60	These	principles	
referred	to	the	idea	of	an	organic	or	corporative	society	as	it	was	thought	to	
have	existed	in	mediaeval	and	early	modern	times.	According	to	this	view,	
each	circle	of	life,	such	as	the	family,	educational	institutions,	work,	science,	
church	and	the	nation,	had	its	own	function	and	ought	to	be	protected	from	
state	interference.	Both	principles	were	directed	against	liberal	individualism,	
democratic	majority	rule	and	the	liberal	fiction	of	the	impartial	state.	Orthodox	
Protestants	and	Roman	Catholics	regarded	the	liberal	educational	acts	as	a	
60 Abraham Kuyper, Souvereiniteit in eigen kring. Rede 
ter inwijding van de Vrije Universiteit, den 20sten 
october 1880 (Amsterdam 1880); Abraham Kuyper, 
Het calvinisme. Zes Stone-lezingen in oktober 1898 
te Princeton (N.J.) gehouden, G. Harinck (ed.) 
(Soesterberg 2002); W. Goddijn and J. Sloot, 
‘Katholieke sociologie. Opkomst en ondergang 
van een sociale leer’, in: F. Bovenkerk et al. (eds.), 
Toen en thans. De sociale wetenschappen in der 
jaren dertig en nu (Baarn 1978) 168-174; Paul Luykx, 
Andere katholieken. Opstellen over Nederlandse 
katholieken in de twintigste eeuw (Nijmegen 2000) 
231; Hans Verhage, Katholieken, Kerk en Wereld. 
Roermond en Helmond in de lange negentiende eeuw 
(Hilversum 2003) 26-27. 
58 Lex Heerma van Voss, ‘De rode dreiging … en 
het verzuilde antwoord’, in: J.C.H. Blom and J. 
Talsma (eds.), Verzuiling voorbij. Godsdienst, stand 
en natie in de lange negentiende eeuw (Amsterdam 
2000) 115-132; Wijfjes, Journalistiek in Nederland 
1850-2000, 178.
59 Dirk Jan Wolffram, ‘Schikken en inschikken. 
Plaatselijke elites in tijden van verzuiling 1850-
1920’, in: Blom and Talsma, Verzuiling voorbij, 
80-102. 
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demonstration	of	state	oppression.	Towards	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	
when	state	intervention	started	to	expand,	the	confessional	parties	made	it	
their	principle	to	curtail	state	power,	or	else	to	divert	it	to	their	own	use.
	 This	policy	would	prove	of	quite	some	consequence	to	the	development	
of	democracy	in	the	Netherlands.	The	revised	Dutch	constitution	of	1848	
had	turned	the	monarchical	order	into	a	parliamentary	system	by	curtailing	
the	king’s	executive	power,	introducing	full	ministerial	responsibility	and	
investing	parliament	with	new	powers.	Yet,	under	the	new	poll	tax	system,	no	
more	than	about	ten	percent	of	adult	males	were	enfranchised	(about	eighteen	
percent	in	municipal	elections).	It	took	time	to	put	the	new	parliamentary	
system	into	practice,	and	politics	tended	to	remain	very	much	an	upper-class	
matter.	Parliament	operated	at	a	safe	distance	from	society.	The	franchise	was	
extended	in	1887	and	1896,	eventually	giving	the	vote	to	about	fifty	percent	
of	adult	males.	The	constitutional	reform	of	1917	(amended	in	1919)	granted	
universal	suffrage	to	men,	and	from	1919	also	to	women.
	 A	comparative	historical	investigation	into	the	establishment	of	liberal	
democracy	reveals	four	patterns.61	A	first	group	of	countries	realized	universal	
(male)	suffrage	at	an	early	stage,	a	second	group	went	through	a	bumpy	course	
of	radical	progress	followed	by	reaction,	and	in	a	third	group	the	process	
stagnated,	only	to	be	resumed	in	the	twentieth	century.	The	Netherlands	
belong,	together	with	Belgium,	Great	Britain,	Denmark,	Norway	and	Sweden	
to	a	fourth	group	of	countries	with	a	rather	regular,	periodical	expansion	
of	the	franchise,	attaining	universal	franchise	about	1918.	Important	as	the	
1917	constitutional	reform	in	the	Netherlands	was	in	resolving	some	long-
standing	political	issues,	formal	democracy	seems	to	have	been	achieved	as	
if	in	passing.	Popular	sovereignty	was	not	invoked	then,	nor	has	it	been	ever	
since.	Since	the	short-lived	constitution	of	1798,	the	Dutch	political	system	
has	always	done	without	definitions	or	allocations	of	sovereignty,	leaving	
such	issues	to	practice.	Besides,	democracy	as	such	was	far	from	undisputed	by	
1918.	Neither	the	upper	middle-class	liberals	nor	the	orthodox	Protestants,	
nor	the	Roman-Catholics	(who	made	up	about	forty	percent	of	the	nation),	
nor	the	socialists	championed	parliamentary	democracy	as	a	principle.	To	
the	socialists,	this	was	initially	no	more	than	a	phase	or	a	means	to	an	end.	
Liberals	had	thrown	in	the	towel,	but	found	compensation	in	the	new	system	
of	proportional	representation,	which	safeguarded	the	position	of	minorities.	
The	confessional	parties	preferred	corporative	or	organic	representation	to	
democratic	individualism	and	majority	rule.	However,	since	the	1870s,	all	
parties	had	more	or	less	contributed	to	the	realization	of	universal	suffrage,	
either	hoping	to	control	the	process	or	to	secure	a	proportional	share	of	
power.62
61 H. Spoormans, ‘Met uitsluiting van voorregt’. Het 
ontstaan van liberale democratie in. Nederland 
(Amsterdam 1988).
62 Ibidem, chapter 2; Gert van Klinken, Actieve 
burgers. Nederlanders en hun politieke partijen, 
1870-1918 (Amsterdam 2003).
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	 Universal	suffrage	resulted	in	a	lasting	majority	for	the	confessional	
parties,	a	stable	twenty-five	percent	following	for	socialism,	and	a	fifteen	
percent	share	for	liberal	parties.	Parliament	and	government	now	became	
the	arena	in	which	the	strongly	organized	communities	bargained.	The	
confessional	parties	shielded	their	separate	domains	of	church,	schools,	aid	
and	health	care	institutions	from	interference	by	the	public	authorities.	
Typical	of	the	Dutch	situation	was	the	ascendancy	of	organized	society	over	
the	political	domain.	As	the	confessional	groups,	the	social	democrats	and	
the	liberals	attached	great	value	to	association,	the	organizational	level	of	
society	was	very	high.	Political	representation	was	but	a	part	of	these	societal	
conglomerates.	Government	was	seen	as	merely	a	‘partner’	in	a	complex	
of	trade	unions,	employers’	associations,	federations	of	all	sorts	and	sizes	
and	consultative	bodies,	either	state	subsidized	or	not.	This	neo-corporatist	
system	was	democratic,	in	the	sense	that	citizens	and	government	were	
connected	through	numerous	intermediary	organizations.	It	was	also	steeped	
in	vested	interests	and	made	both	democracy	and	citizens	politically	inert	
and	little	disposed	towards	innovation.	State	power,	expanding	in	the	course	
of	the	twentieth	century,	became	wrapped	up	in	a	complex	of	organizations	
representing	citizens’	interests.	Political	rhetoric	played	its	part	in	upholding	
ideological	distinctions,	but	in	fact	Dutch	politics	was	characterized	by	
pragmatism	and	a	managerial	approach.	
In conclusion
Having	reached	its	peak	by	1960,	the	pillarized	system	then	rapidly	started	to	
disintegrate.	In	the	1960s	and	1970s,	Dutch	society	zealously	scrutinized	its	
democracy.	This	whirl	of	reform	brought	about	a	thorough	democratization	
of	society	and	culture,	but	not	of	the	political	system.	At	the	same	time,	
the	welfare	state	was	taking	over	from	the	system	of	private	social	welfare	
institutions.	A	statist	bureaucracy	expanded	in	the	process.	In	accordance	
with	the	ideology	of	the	market	that	pervaded	government	policies	since	the	
1980s,	welfare,	educational,	housing	and	humanitarian	aid	organizations	
were	supposed	to	operate	as	commercial	companies.	In	the	meantime	the	
citizens,	who	formerly	had	been	the	members	and	supporters	of	a	society	
based	system	of	institutions,	withdrew	from	the	old	associations	such	as	
trade	unions	and	the	political	parties.	As	a	consequence,	citizens	became	
customers.	Nevertheless,	the	degree	of	social	participation	and	association	
remains	extensive,	although	there	is	a	tendency	towards	more	impersonal	
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and	noncommittal,	‘chequebook’	or	virtual	forms	of	association.63	Today’s	
assertive	‘monitory	citizens’	make	use	of	other	means	to	voice	their	interests	
and	to	scrutinize	power,	whether	political	or	commercial.	They	use	the	media,	
open	forums,	consultative	and	deliberative	bodies,	legal	action,	professional	
lobbies,	pressure	and	action	groups	and	ngos	to	exert	influence.64
	 All	in	all,	consensus	democracy	has	proven	to	suit	a	densely	organized,	
pluralistic	and	heterogeneous	society.65	The	proportional	representation	
system,	established	in	1917,	has	been	found	to	be	quite	responsive	to	
minorities.	It	has	demonstrated	that	the	emphasis	in	Dutch	democracy	is	
on	representation,	rather	than	on	the	executive	power	of	government.66	
Consensus	democracy	has	managed	to	reduce	or	channel	social	conflict,	
be	it	class	struggle	or	religious	tensions.	It	has	also	managed	to	transform	
the	Netherlands	into	a	successful,	highly	competitive	industrial	and	post-
industrial	welfare	state.	On	the	other	hand,	consensus	democracy	tends	
towards	the	paternalistic,	complacent	and	managerial.	It	has	proven	slow	
to	recognize	and	to	counter	deep	undercurrents	of	change	in	the	general	
mindset	or	in	public	opinion.67	Constituting	one	of	the	most	corporatist	
systems	among	industrial	democracies	in	the	world,	the	Dutch	polity	has	been	
typified	as	‘an	orchestra	with	no	conductor’.	The	contemporary	shift	‘from	
government	to	governance’	in	Western	democracies	has	a	long	history	in	the	
Netherlands.68	This	tendency	however	is	not	conducive	to	enhancing	people’s	
commitment	to	politics.	
	 This	article	set	out	to	argue,	firstly,	that	early-modern	urban	
corporatist	society	as	it	operated	in	the	Dutch	Republic	may	rank	as	a	form	
of	civil	society;	secondly,	that	religion,	both	moderate	and	zealous,	can	and	
did	enhance	the	formation	of	civil	society	and	democracy;	and	thirdly,	that	
a	strong	civil	society	can	eventually	impede	further	development	of	formal,	
political	democracy.	In	general,	Dutch	history	appears	to	constitute	a	perfect	
example	of	the	way	civil	society	is	conducive	to	the	rise	of	democracy.	It	meets	
four	requirements	mentioned	by	Philip	Nord	in	this	respect.69	Nord	points	to	
early	tolerance	on	the	part	of	the	authorities	with	regard	to	social	association.	
A	second	precondition	would	be	stable	integration	of	the	countryside	into	
66 Ank Michels, ‘Theories and Core Principles of 
Dutch Democracy’ (2007), European Governance 
Papers (eurogov), C-07-01, www.connex-network.
org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-07-01.pdf.
67 Cf. James Kennedy, Bezielende verbanden. 
Gedachten over religie, politiek en maatschappij in 
het moderne Nederland (Amsterdam 2009).
68 Andeweg and Irwin, Governance, 169, 191.
69 Nord, ‘Introduction’, xxiii-xxviii.
63 Dekker, ‘Europäische Zivilgesellschaften’, 103-120; 
Andeweg and Irwin, Governance, 13.
64 The advent of a novel type of ‘monitory 
democracy’ is substantiated by John Keane, The 
Life and Death of Democracy (London 2009); 
also see Michael Schudson, The Good Citizen: A 
History of American Civic Live (New York 1998). 
65 Andeweg and Irwin, Governance, chapter 11.
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the	civil	life	of	the	nation.	The	third	involves	a	positive	role	for	religious	
inspiration,	particularly	of	dissenting	and	evangelical	fervour,	in	nineteenth-
century	urban	culture.	The	fourth	requirement	concerns	the	extent	to	which	
the	parliamentary	system	was	established	at	the	emergence	of	mass	politics.	
All	four	preconditions	fully	apply	to	the	Dutch	case.	Even	the	attitude	
and	position	of	Dutch	Roman	Catholicism	favoured	the	formation	of	civil	
society.70	
	 Looking	for	continuity	in	the	Dutch	political	system	over	the	last	two	
centuries	is	problematic.	But	there	is	an	unmistakable	legacy	when	it	comes	
to	society	and	practices.	Since	the	seventeenth	century	at	least,	Dutch	society	
has	demonstrated	a	high	degree	of	organization,	mainly	within	an	urban	
or	small-town	setting:	first	through	corporative	bodies	and	church-related	
charity	institutions,	later	also	through	a	plethora	of	voluntary	associations,	
with	either	a	more	private	or	a	more	public	character.	There	were	always	
strong	social	ties	connecting	citizens	horizontally	and	vertically.	This	
social	environment	trained	citizens	in	social	skills,	fostered	their	sense	of	
commitment,	opened	up	ways	for	them	to	voice	their	interests	and	taught	
them	to	bargain.	This	‘social	capital’	however	didn’t	automatically	create	a	
need	for	democratization.	
	 Indeed,	the	wealth	of	Dutch	‘social	capital’	appears	to	have	been	
accumulated	at	the	expense	of	political	zeal.	Apart	from	a	few	short	periods,	
Dutch	society	did	not	usually	take	a	great	interest	in	politics	as	such.	There	
has	always	been	a	dislike	of	political	dissent	and	a	tendency	toward	political	
indifference.	This	attitude	arose	from	a	concept	of	citizenship	which	
highlights	not	political	but	social	activity.	When,	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	
century,	politics	democratized,	it	was	in	fact	being	colonized	by	a	segmenting	
onderwijs en natievorming in Nederland 1850-
1900 (Amsterdam 1996) 29-44; Henk van 
den Berg, In vrijheid gebonden. Negentiende-
eeuwse katholieke publicisten in Nederland 
over geloof, politiek en moderniteit (Nijmegen 
2005); Cf. Hermann-Josef Grosse Kracht, 
‘Religiöse Fremdlinge in der modernen Welt? 
Ultramontane Katholiken im 19. Jahrhundert und 
die Frage nach den Entstehungskontexten einer 
zivilgesellschaftlichen Demokratie’, in: Jessen, 
Reichardt and Klein, Zivilgesellschaft, 89-113.
70 Cf. Kennedy, ‘Kirchen’ and José Casanova, 
Public Religions in the Modern World (Chicago 
1994). On Dutch Roman Catholicism: J.P. 
de Valk, Roomser dan de paus? Studies over 
de betrekkingen tussen de Heilige Stoel en het 
Nederlands katholicisme, 1815-1940 (Nijmegen 
1998); Paul Luykx, Andere katholieken; Peter 
Raedts, ‘Tussen Rome en Den Haag. De integratie 
van de Nederlandse katholieken in kerk en 
staat’, in: Henk te Velde and Hans Verhage 
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civil	society.	Politics	and	democracy	have	since	been	treated	as	mere	agents	
in	the	service	of	societal	interests.	As	a	result,	they	have	taken	on	managerial	
features.
	 Today,	Dutch	citizens	indicate	that	they	highly	value	their	democracy,	
but	dislike	politics.71	They	claim	a	further	democratization	of	the	system,	
yet	do	not	consider	this	a	prime	issue.72	Successful	initiatives	to	enhance	
democracy	chiefly	focus	on	‘interactive	policymaking’	and	forms	of	
deliberation.	They	do	not	entail	reforms	of	the	political	system.	This	pattern	
reveals	that	citizens	only	partly	associate	democracy	with	politics.	In	their	
view,	democratic	achievements	such	as	equality,	freedom	of	expression,	self-
fulfilment	and	prosperity	are	embedded	in	society	and	culture.	The	principles	
of	social	democracy	and	mass	culture	have	become	internalized.	The	strong	
development	of	society	in	the	Netherlands	appears	to	have	produced	the	
illusion	that	politics,	even	democratic	politics,	is	fairly	irrelevant.73	Thus	
Dutch	democracy	demonstrates	the	strengths,	as	well	as	the	limitations,	of	
being	rooted	in	civil	society.		q
Remieg Aerts (1957) is Professor of Political History at the Radboud University Nijmegen. His field 
of research concerns principally Dutch history after 1750, the cultural aspects of political business 
and politics as a phenomenon. His publications include	Het aanzien van de politiek. Geschiedenis van 
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III. Hoofdstad in aanbouw 1813-1900 (Amsterdam 2006) and De letterheren. Liberale cultuur in de 
negentiende eeuw. Het tijdschrift De Gids	(Amsterdam 1997).	
71 Herman van Gunsteren and Rudy Andeweg, Het 
grote ongenoegen. Over de kloof tussen burgers en 
politiek (Haarlem 1994); Herman van Gunsteren, 
‘Voor democratie maar tegen politiek’, in: 
Joop van Holsteyn and Cas Mudde (eds.), 
Democratie in verval (Amsterdam 2002) 17-32. 
Still, the level of political trust is comparatively 
high in the Netherlands: Dekker, ‘Europäische 
Zivilgesellschaften’.
72 Van Baalen, ‘Mehr Demokratie?’; Kennedy, 
‘Democratie’.
73 Henk te Velde, ‘Politieke cultuur, verenigingen en 
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Religion in the Modern 
Netherlands and the Problems of 
Pluralism  
	
	 james c. kennedy and jan p. zwemer | 
 university of amsterdam and serooskerke
The religious history of the Netherlands during the last two centuries exhibits 
some of the same dynamics and tensions as those evidenced in neighbouring 
countries. This article selects from religious history three historiographical 
issues salient to transnational patterns. The first pertains to Dutch church-
state relations in the nineteenth century, most notably a relatively early 
disestablishment. The second theme concerns the so-called ‘pillarization’ 
(verzuiling) of Dutch society, and to what extent pillarization – to the extent 
it is a useful concept at all – can be regarded as a quintessentially ‘Dutch’ way 
to manage religious pluralism. The last theme focuses on secularization, a 
concept which historians have used to analyse the decline of organized religion 
in the Netherlands, particularly the sharp decline in religious participation and 
adherence after 1960. Religion, however, has remained an important focus of 
debate in recent decades, as the Dutch sought again to renegotiate the politics 
of pluralism.
In	religious	terms,	the	modern	Netherlands	has	been	a	country	of	paradoxes.	
For	the	last	century,	the	numbers	of	those	disclaiming	any	religious	affiliation	
have	been	among	the	highest	in	Europe,	a	phenomenon	strengthened	by	
the	absence	of	a	state	church.	At	the	same	time,	the	country’s	public	life	in	
the	last	two	centuries	has	been	characterized	by	uncommonly	powerful	
religious	movements	that	shaped	–	and	to	some	degree	still	shape	–	the	
fields	of	politics,	education	and	media.	A	Protestant	country	(nearly	two-
thirds	of	its	population	were	so	identified	in	the	nineteenth	century)	with	a	
historically	Protestant-dominant	state,	the	Netherlands	became,	by	the	mid-
twentieth	century,	a	country	where	the	fulcrum	of	power	lay	in	the	hands	
of	the	Catholic	political	party	(Katholieke Volkspartij),	who	represented	a	large	
and	rather	well-disciplined	religious	minority.1	An	Islamic	power	–	insofar	
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